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       Abstract  
    With regard to the new directions in the Humanities, here I am going to consider and examine 
the approach of al-Farabi as a medieval thinker in introducing a new outlook to “language” in 
difference with the other views. Thereby, I will explore his challenges in the frame of 
“philosophical humanism” as a term given by Arkoun (1970) and Kraemer (1984) to the 
humanism of the Islamic philosophers and their circles, mainly in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries.    
          Al-Farabi’s conception of philosophical humanism, in which philosophy is thick and 
religion is thin, makes its agony with the other versions of humanism and also orthodox Islam. It 
means that his introduction of a humanistic understanding of language should be placed in such a 
multi-level contested environment.     
        According to al-Farabi, language as a universal category has relation with reason that logic 
should function as its proper instrument. As a result, there is no specific privileged 
predetermined language, but the position of any language is shaped by its relation with human 
reason and formal logic that is something human-made. And such a conception means language 
in human terms.  
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     As the title of the paper shows, I am going to explore and introduce Al-Farabi’s conception of 
language within a specific kind of mediaeval Islamic model named “humanism”. Therefore, 
when I speak of “language in human terms” it means that I will examine it within a specific 
version of humanism which is called “philosophical humanism” and I will begin my presentation 
with that.   
                                    1- Philosophical/ Falsafi Humanism 
Beyond the absolute optimistic and pessimistic perspectives, in considering the use of 
Philosophical Humanism for medieval Islam, here I explore it in a specific way. The 
compound term “philosophical humanism” denotes that there are possible forms of 
humanism which we deal with one of them. Besides, this term literally implies that we want 
to consider a form of humanism that is realizable through philosophy that functions as its 
moving force. And more importantly, among other possibilities and options, we want to 
consider philosophical humanism in relation to a specific context and thinker that belong to 
the mediaeval Islam. This very notion can make great debate about the relevancy of such a 
connection that in its own turn will have consequences for the term “philosophical 
humanism” as a whole and for each word separately. Here in regard to such relation and the 
relevancy of the term for Al-Farabi, I will take a middle position between the absolute 
negation and absolute affirmation (for the main proponents of these two camps within and 
without the Arabo-Islamic culture see: Joel L. Kraemer 1984, 140- 146). As a result, I want 
to speak of humanism among one of the Muslim falāsifa named Al-Farabi who lived in a 
specific time and place of the medieval era. In this period, a kind of “the Graeco-Arabic 
renaissance” at the apogee of the Abbasid epoque in the ninth and tenth centuries shaped 
and came to completion (Joel L. Kraemer 1984, 135). When we consider our intended 
version of humanism within this specific context, it has three basic components: unity of 
mankind; love of mankind; and appropriative reception / interpretation of Hellenism and 
classical Graeco- Roman authorities and resources (Joel L. Kraemer 1984, 136). Now we 
consider briefly these three features:    
a- Unity of Mankind. In this specific period, the application and use of different notions 
such as Islam; Arab; Arabic and the like with the purpose of making connections and 
reducing barriers for making an Islamic empire contributed to a specific sense of limited 
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brotherhood and kinship among different people that lived in separate lands. Thus, in “the 
Graeco-Arabic renaissance” the idea of human fellowship that has roots in the ancient 
Greek/Latin, Hellenism and also the Islamic resources found its political realization in the 
form of a cosmopolitan entity and to the point that this cosmopolitanism was alive, the 
idea that supported it had validation and power.  
b- Love of Mankind. It is natural that limited kinship of human kinds leads minds to the 
criteria that make men related to each other, and as a result to extol and glorify such 
standards. Here lies a more advanced phase of humanism because a long list of values 
that manifest humanness such as virtue, reason, language, goodness, faith, character, 
education, knowledge, culture and the like come to the fore. Thereby, loving these values 
makes us human and connects us with each other as a human family and the opposite of 
those values makes distinctions between human and any kind of non-human. Therefore, 
believing and practicing these humane values means loving human beings because of 
these lovable virtues.     
c- Reception of Hellenism and Classical Graeco- Roman Resources/Authorities.  Such an 
enigmatic topic in continuation of our previous title has importance for both our discussion 
on humanism in medieval Islam and the adjective philosophical / falsafi. In relation to 
humanism in the Graeco-Arabic renaissance, the issue is about the nature and quality of 
engagement of those thinkers who contributed to such a development. For it is granted that 
they had reception from the Hellenism and classical Graeco- Roman resources and thinkers, 
then the issue is about the humane / moral quality of such an involvement in general.  
   On the whole, the Islamic medieval thinkers had different selective, constrictive, 
transformative (Falatouri 1973), and ideological/translational (Gutas 1998) readings of the 
Hellenism and classical Graeco- Roman resources and thinkers for their theoretical / practical 
purposes in order to support and validate their own basic principles that they usually attributed to 
Islam.  
       Thereby, we can enter to our intended meaning of the adjective philosophical/ falsafi. 
During the ninth and tenth centuries within Muslim empire, humanism with the mentioned 
characteristics in definite ways is promoted and gained prominence by a group of scholars who 
as a whole were described and called by a specific epithet. It means that in the tenth century 
among different learned assemblies, there formed specific interconnections between humanism 
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and a group of friendly scholars / falasifa ,called Baghdad school, that beyond their religions 
shared the common language of Arabic and worked mostly on the ancient Greek wisdom/ 
philosophy / falsafa as the crown of both knowledge and education/adab. Thereby, we can see 
some components of the dominant ethos and spirit of the Baghdad school as the symbol of 
“philosophical humanism” that have affected its members and among them Al-Farabi. In this 
relation, notions such as the universality, truthfulness, valuableness, commonality, and 
transmission of ancient Greek knowledge / falsafa are significant in constructing the intellectual 
identity of Baghdad school in distinction of the other contemporary rival and extant schools.  
      Interestingly, within this intellectual milieu, though the same term and detailed discussion 
about the term humanism is absent in Al-Farabi’s writings, his brief analysis and conception 
about another related term that is humanity/  اﻻﮫﯿﻧﺎﺴﻧ    (Kitab al-Huruf / Book of Letters 1969, 82) 
is available. According to his short analysis, it seems that he has two notions of it in his mind: 
the quality that all men share in common which is their human nature; and the virtues that make 
an individual humane such as being refined, rational, social, civil, brave, polite, and the like. We 
use these meanings of “humanity” as heuristic notions in order to reach to a possible and 
justifiable notion about “humanism” in Al-Farabi. With limiting ourselves to Kitab al-Huruf that 
is also the focus of this paper, I will infer that giving priority to “reasonability” and “sociability” 
can be the possible Al-Farabian version of “Humanism” that he argues and justifies such a 
meaning by “philosophy”. For these virtues make connections among people and thereby, they 
love each other for the reason that they have such excellences (though in different degrees 
because all are not equal in having them) as the essence of humanism, and as a result a kind of 
connection realizes among those who are like each other in these two virtues. At the same time, 
our intended thinker justifies such a love and unity by philosophy (not any other discipline) that 
comes back to ancient Greek and reaches to its completion by Aristotle (143).  
                                      2 - Language in Human Terms  
    Now on the basis of Al-Farabi’s intellectual milieu, school, masters and his general mode 
of thinking and behavior that is a specific kind of philosophical/ falsafi humanism, I want to 
consider his conception of language through zooming on the second part of Kitab al-Huruf 
/ The Book of Letters. 
    To explore and examine language, he chooses a specific Aristotelian anthro-topological 
introduction (114) in which on the earth all the people with native wit are distributed in 
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different and definite livable local units. On this basis, for exploring language, his units of 
analysis are “intelligent people” (not isolated unintelligent individuals) who live in specific 
“territories”. It is noteworthy that both the distribution of the different people on different 
parts of the earth and also their abodes on one specific land are very essential in Al-Farabi’s 
account on language in human terms. Though he begins with the more general image of 
human distributions on earth but when he comes to the issue of the more pure /unmixed 
/correct or grammatical language, his account becomes more specific and internal and says 
that such a language can be gained from those who live on deserts or in the middle of any 
specific geographical unit. And in this relation, he mentions to the situation of medieval 
Iraq and how those who lives in urban areas acquire the correct and eloquent Arabic 
language from those who live in deserts (not town) and middle (not border) parts of this 
specific territory (133;134;135).  
     Thus, human beings – constituted of bodies and souls - who live in different specific 
abodes have definite natural inborn qualities and characteristics that through them make 
progressions. As a result, in the initial phase of men existence in different living units, 
human beings use their bodies and souls in ways that are “easier, spontaneous and natural” 
for them (114;115. The direct connections of these terms are very evident in 115), in 
differentiation of pre-thought and designed endeavors and efforts. Therefore, in this initial 
period that all the people as unities and communities are distributed in different aboding 
units they are connected and distinguished from each other. And for Al-Farabi in this 
primitive phase, it is natural - in distinction of what is in human constitution /    تﺮﻄﻓ , 
habituation/    دﺎﯿﺘﻋا  and art  /  ﺖﻋﺎﻨﺻ - for the people that use and direct the related functions 
of their bodies and souls in the ways that were easier and typical for them. We can say he 
speaks of the living of the “natural men” in the “natural state”.   
     Within his short Aristotelian anthro/topological account, Al-Farabi presents an 
evolutionary and historical process that leads to language. For when natural human beings 
as functional intelligent collectivities are distributed and dwelled in different parts of the 
earth, they want to inform the other people of what are in their “minds”, and as a result they 
need media that at first are visible gestures /        هرﺎﺷا       and then are speech-sounds/         
 تﻮﺻ     (116. Leneshmidt). For him, it is granted that human beings as social /intelligent 
and not individual/unintelligent animals want to communicate and make what are in their 
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“minds” understandable for the other people, and this issue necessitates provision of 
specific instruments that make such a purpose possible. This idea is very crucial and we 
should be remembered that for Al-Farabi what are in our “minds” have some relations with 
“things” and “objects” that are outside of our souls (detailed account in Germann 2015-
2016.140 -145). Therefore, here Al-Farabi speaks of those people who have passed from 
the first phase in forming conception and abstraction of the things they conceive; and then 
by suitable instruments they want to represent and communicate those intelligibles. Thus, 
Al-Farabi takes the first phase for granted; and now zooms on the relation of suitable 
instrument for signifying what are in their minds to the other people. Accordingly, complete 
form of this process has three components; thing, thought and representing-thought and 
here he deals with the two latters.  At this phase, human beings seek an “instrument” in 
order to “represent/    ﺖﻟﻻد ” what is in their thoughts that they have reached through 
thinking, and such a thinking is the same for all of the people, and it makes a 
communicability and unity among human beings. And within philosophical humanism, this 
notion means language in human terms, because the natural commonsensical human beings 
who live in the same dwelling want to communicate and represent to the same people what 
they have in their minds as intelligibles that are abstractions of objects.   
       For al-Farabi, all people see direct relation between thought and communication of 
thought in which the latter somehow should “represent / mimesis” the former. The initial, 
natural and easy pre-language instrument is “gestures/ هرﺎﺷﻻا ” (116) that can be seen in a 
limited visible range by the people involved. Though gestures are unavoidable media but 
they are not sufficient and complete, and as a result the people spontaneously go towards 
deploying “speech-sounds/ ﺖﯾﻮﺼﺘﻟا ” (116). In this relation, Al-Farabi gives a short 
bisection of the speech-sounds into direct address /  اﺪﻧ ; and speech-sounds in particular 
(116). As the term direct address [vocative in grammar] indicates, it is directed to specific 
people to the exclusion of the others and it occurs “when he [every human being] restricts 
himself to signifying what he has in mind by means of a gesture about sense perceptions 
that are in his mind” (116). But it is not sufficient and human beings go toward speech-
sound in particular that has oral and written manifestations. First, we read the oral aspect: 
“Then after that he uses different speech-sounds by each of which he signifies one of the 
things he signified by gesturing to it or to sense perceptions of it” (Leneshmidt 116).  Then 
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he mentions to “letters of the alphabet/  ﮫﻤﺠﻌﻤﻟا فوﺮﺣ  ” ( 118) as the representors of vocal 
sounds. It means that speech-sounds according to the meaning/concept that they want to 
represent, can be materialized in the form of simple / individual or complex/compound 
letters. Thus, when individual sounds are insufficient and we should combine some speech-
sounds with each other in order to form an utterance/ ﻆﻔﻟ (119), the same will be done in 
relation with the letters too.  
     In relation to the production of speech-sounds, Al-Farabi mentions to the specific roles 
and functions of the human organs specially “tongue” in their pronunciations. More 
importantly, the functions and moves of tongue inside the human mouth are dependent on 
the specific different characters and constitutions of the organs of the people who live and 
reside in different places of the earth. As a result, the people, who live in a particular land 
and their speech-sounds organs have common constitution and quality, move their tongue 
in specific ways and pronounce this or that speech-sound, in distinction of the people who 
live in another land and their speech-sounds organs have different qualities.  
     Accordingly, we can say that Al-Farabi considers a progression and evolution from the 
initial body movements of hands or head, that is gesturing/ تارﺎﺷﻻا ; to direct addressing/ اﺪﻧ  
as the middle phase, and lastly, to speech-sounds/ ﺖﯾﻮﺼﺘﻟا (118) . The third phase is an 
advancement because the intelligent people who live as a community in a definite territory 
want to communicate their thoughts by different and distinct sounds or a group of sounds. 
While, in the initial primitive phase meanings are made known by “gestures”, and in the 
second or middle phase intentions are understandable through direct address, in the 
advanced phase distinct communities of people want to signify things by going beyond 
gesturing and addressing, that is, they pronounce sounds that represent specific meaning (s) 
and have relations both with their pertinent objects; and our perceptions of them. And in 
this evolutionary process, the core issue and function is “representation/ mimesis”: the 
letters signify speech-sounds, the latter the intelligibles, and the last sensible things /objects 
(Al-Farabi supposes that we knew this chain of Aristotelian background.)     
     Up to here as we have seen, in the process that leads to language formation on the two 
levels of voice and letter, human beings as social intelligent animals who live in different 
dwellings (not scattered and isolated individual or divine entities) have an exclusive role. At 
least, there should be two individuals in which one of them as maker/speaker wants to 
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communicate and signify his or her thoughts to the other individual who is listener in order 
to reach a limited agreement about language and by spreading such communication and 
agreement among the other people of the same habitation (120), they gradually make many 
complex sounds-letters among and for themselves.  
      In Al-Farabi, this normal and customary process continues until the necessity of some 
professionals is felt to do the same task in the fields which the ordinary people have never 
thought about. It means “someone emerges who governs their affairs/  ﻢھﺮﻣا ﺮ ّﺑﺪﯾ     and 
devotes himself to making emerge the [complex] speech-sounds they need for the 
remaining matters that no one among them happened to signify by speech-sounds. He, then, 
will be the one who sets down/  ﻊﺿاو  the language/ نﺎﺴﻟ    of that inhabitants” (120). From  
then on, formation of language continues among those who govern the affairs of any 
specific abodes (a platonic idea that we can read in Cratylus).  
      On this basis, we can consider Al-Farabi account of language formation in the human 
communities in the form of a pyramid in which at the bottom line the process in its general 
natural meaning begins with the multitude of the natural commonsensical people who dwell 
on any geographical area in spontaneous and rational ways, then gradually this process goes 
upward and we reach to the top of the pyramid in which a few professional experts who are 
responsible for deliberating the community affairs and working on the unexplored aspects 
of language deal with language formation in its specific meaning in a step by step way that 
includes seven stages ( we can read the details of them in 120, 121). 
       From here on, another and more developed dimension of language in human terms 
manifest itself. According to Al-Farabi, if the inhabitants of different territories be naturally 
“moderate” and tend toward “intelligence and knowledge”(122) an advanced and 
complementary kind of working with language takes shape. It means that human beings 
with specific ethical and rational qualities, in a more advanced phase should venture these 
two tasks on the semantic and structural levels respectively (Germann  2015-2016, 149): to 
bring the constructed utterances close to [representational of] their pertinent “meanings”; 
and then organize the utterances in accordance with [mimetic of] the “organization” of the 
meanings (122). (Though, natural native language is not always exact and correct and 
sometimes it needs correction by qualified individuals.)     
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   In this relation, the qualified distinguished individuals as wise men - who according to 
130 can be oral transmitters of speeches; poems and memorizers of the historical reports - 
have the basic and initial capacity (123) to distinguish and classify different percepts, 
intelligibles, utterances and meanings (mainly into universal and individual) in order to 
make justifiable and reasonable connection; classification; and terminology. The result of 
such rational efforts is the production of different kinds of utterances such as 
ambiguous/ﮏﮑﺸﻣ ; equivocal/ کﺮﺘﺸﻣ; synonymous فداﺮﺘﻣ; and figurative / زﺎﺠﻣ in different 
branches(124-127).  
    Accordingly, the native (not foreign), perfect, correct and standard natural language of 
each specific human community is shaped internally by those rational/moderate people who 
are born and live in their own community and shape their language as something habitual, 
familiar and friendly construct that over a long period of time, generation after generation, 
it is formed and transmitted to the next younger generations (128, 130). It is interesting that 
Al-Farabi narrates a familiar account for the shaping of the art of the knowledge of language /      نﺎﺳﻠﻟا مﻠﻋ تﻋﺎﻧﺻ (132,138). This art is formed gradually by some interested 
individuals in language that take it through time from the native, accustomed, correct and 
unmixed language of the non-urban and  natural (that according to 134 is equal to savage 
and wild) people who live in desserts and middle of the inhabited lands (133). And in this 
regard on the basis of Al-Farabi direct experience and knowledge, Arabic language and the 
Arabs have no privilege and different position in comparison with the other languages and 
people.  
     As a result, in the framework of the “medieval Muslim philosophical humanism”, and 
Al-Farabi’s “Aristotelian anthro-topological” account about language (and also the art of 
the knowledge of language), it comes out of the endeavors and doings of rational/logical 
(Carter 1997, 28,29), language (Makdisi 1990, 15;19;20) and social human beings in an 
evolutionary way in order to signify and represent (make mimesis of) what is in their minds 
of the things and share it with their fellow people.     
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